The Political Economy of Municipal Transfers: Evidence from Mexico
- Autores: Jeffrey F. Timmons, Daniel Broid
- Localización: Publius: the journal of federalism, ISSN 0048-5950, Vol. 43, Nº. 4, 2013, págs. 551-579
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
-
Resumen
How do fiscal institutions, partisanship, and governance affect federal transfers to municipalities? We address this question using a novel research design and data set for Mexico. We compare the state-level obligations for federal transfers to municipalities with the distribution of these funds as reported by municipalities. This strategy allows us to know whether state-level formulas are binding, whether there are partisan skews in the formula, and how and why governors reallocate funds. We find that state-level fiscal institutions are quite binding; even so, deviations from the formula total approximately US$300–500 million annually. Whereas Partido Revolucionario Institucional governors appear to reallocate to municipalities when they are governed by their co-partisans, Partido Acción Nacional and Partido de la Revolución Democrática governors appear to reallocate funds to municipalities for equity, stabilization, and disasters (with no detectable partisan bias).
