The battle of Tanga, lasting from 2 to 5 November 1914, between the British and Germans was the opening clash in a relatively little-known campaign that was to last over four years. It was conceived as part of a wider plan to ensure British maritime superiority in the Indian Ocean as well as depriving the Germans of their system of overseas wireless transmission stations. However, through a lack of considered analysis and departmental ambitions, it evolved into an ill-thought-out attempt to seize the whole of German East Africa with two brigades of the Indian army. The landings at Tanga were compromised by the need to renounce a local truce, followed by the dilatory disembarkation of the fighting troops. A rapid attempt to take the town was bloodily repulsed by the German defenders and a second, more deliberate attack was similarly defeated. Fearing a greater catastrophe, the British force withdrew to British East Africa and assumed a defensive posture. The affair highlighted a number of weaknesses and defects in British training and operational readiness for modern war
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados