The questionable basis of the Common European Sales Law: the role of an optional instrument in jurisdictional competition

• Autores: Eric A. Posner
• Localización: Common market law review, ISSN 0165-0750, Vol. 50, Nº Extra 1 (Especial), 2013 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Chicago conference), págs. 261-275
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 3 Citas
• Resumen

  • The Common European Sales Law is designed as an optional instrument that European parties engaged in cross-border transactions could choose for their transactions in preference to national law. The goal is to increase cross-border transactions and perhaps to enhance European identity. But the CESL is unlikely to achieve these goals. It raises transaction costs while producing few if any benefits; it is unlikely to spur beneficial jurisdictional competition; its consumer protection provisions will make it unattractive for businesses; and its impact on European identity is likely to be small.