Bicameral Winning Coalitions and Equilibrium Federal Legislatures

• Autores: Anastassios Kalandrakis
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 29, N. 1, 2004, págs. 49-79
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • I analyze the legislative interaction between representatives from big and small states in a bicameral legislature that decides on the allocation of a fixed resource among the states. I assume that the two houses are malapportioned and that the big states are underrepresented in the upper house. By studying the effect of this and other institutional features on the relative welfare of big and small states and on equilibrium coalitions, I find that, contrary to common belief, an increase in the representation of small states may reduce those states' expected payoff, ceteris paribus. Also, contrary to interpretations of minimum-winning-coalition theorems, I demonstrate that excess majorities may occur in one of the two houses. When proposal making tends to be dominated by big (small) states, excess majorities occur in the upper (lower) house. I also find that higher proposal power increases the payoff of a group of states. Changes in the majority requirements in the two houses and expansion to encompass more small (big) states have non-monotonic effects on the relative welfare of the two groups. I conclude my analysis with an empirical application using calibrations results for the 103d U.S. Congress and the legislative institutions of the European Union before and after the Treaty of Nice.