The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy

• Autores: Sarah A. Binder, Forrest Maltzman
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 29, N. 1, 2004, págs. 5-22
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view, arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we show how institutional and political forces increase interested senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees.