Tourism supply-chain coordination: the cooperation between tourism hotel and tour operator
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Xiaolong Guo [1] ; Lina He [1]
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[1] University of Science and Technology of China
University of Science and Technology of China
China
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- Localización: Tourism economics: the business and finance of tourism and recreation, ISSN 1354-8166, Vol. 18, Nº. Extra 6, 2012 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Developments in the field of tourism economics), págs. 1361-1376
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
This paper examines the cooperation problem that occurs when a tour operator cooperates with a tourism hotel with regard to two types of tour packages � luxury and economy. The authors first analyse the effects of basic utilities and prices on demand for the packages. They then build a sequential Stackelberg game model to study this cooperation in a decentralized scenario, and find that the tourism hotel acquires more revenue from the packages than the tour operator owing to its stronger bargaining power. Finally, a quantity-discount contract based on revenue sharing is designed to achieve full coordination in the cooperation, under which the total revenue from the packages is identical to that in a centralized scenario.
