Resumen de Una crítica al argumento Kantiano de McDowell en contra de la percepción animal
Jorge F. Morales Ladrón de Guevara
John McDowell claims that perception is always filtered by concepts or, to say it with the traditional Kantian term, by spontaneity. Without concepts that support perception, it would turn out impossible to have intelligible and ordered perceptions of the external world to justify beliefs. A possible consequence of this kind of argumentation is that non-human animals, unable to generate structured concepts as required by McDowell, are also unable to have ordered perceptions of the outer world. In this paper, I will reconstruct McDowell�s arguments against non-conceptual perception. In second place, I will show the difficulties that arise regarding animal behavior when holding these arguments. I will support my conclusions on Ruth Millikan�s remarks about concepts. In order to do so, I will try to show the possibility of having perceptions, or even concepts, which do not necessarily involve the Kantian spontaneity required by McDowell, but a practical encounter with the world, as suggested by Millikan.
