Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization

• Autores: Philip A. Curry, John E. Roemer
• Localización: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, ISSN 0210-1173, Nº 200, 2012, págs. 131-146
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • in nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium, they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive nash players (for whom the stable concept is nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.