Scientific Realism: The Galilean Strategy, and Representation

• Autores: Mauricio Suárez
• Localización: Scientific realism and democratic society: the Philosophy of Philip Kitcher / coord. por Wenceslao J. González Fernández, 2012, ISBN 978-90-420-3449-5, págs. 269-292
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher�s most recent epistemology of science, real realism. I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term �representation�, and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, which I refer to as the bare view. The bare view accepts Kitcher�s Galilean strategy, and the ensuing commitment to the existence of unobservables; but it does not trade on a correspondence or copy theory of representation. So the bare view, unlike real realism, does not entail that our representations match reality even approximately