The book reviewed here treats of the Israeli- Palestinian military problem as a particular case of the general question of democracies faced with the dilemmas of “counter-insurgency”. Combining Raymond Aron's realistic approach and Michael Walzer's ethical approach, the author recommends a different military policy : one that is guided by “empathy”, acknowledging the Palestinians' suffering and at least the partial validity of their demands, and by “schizophrenia”, pursuing at once the eradication of armed groups and support for civilian populations. This appeal to reason based on “short-term history” (1980-2010) may well overlook the uniqueness of a conflict in which “current events hark back in time” and in which “long[er]-term history” (1920-2010) shows the primacy of “overarching narratives” whose acceptance is a prerequisite for the rational games they authorize. In this case, Zahal's strategic dilemma becomes the Israeli state's political dilemma : to avoid both “hostile empathy” and “defeatist sympathy”.
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