With the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism within established parties, the EU is facing a new challenge: that of soft Eurosceptic governments landing in the rotating presidency�s seat. Albeit not opposing the EU as such, these governments wish to put a brake on developments in further integration and challenge the EU informal norms of legitimacy and expected behaviour. On the basis of four case studies, this article illustrates the ability of the EU to adapt to this new situation � especially in the post-Lisbon era, where presidencies� ability to influence the EU agenda and direction is increasingly limited. Indeed, on the whole, Eurosceptic governments live up to the role of the presidency as manager of the EU day-to-day business. However, in this context, there is a risk that EU partners might neglect potentially authoritarian developments in the country holding the chair, as the Hungarian presidency illustrated. Consequently, while the rotating presidency becomes less permeable to the turmoil of domestic politics, its role as a �magnifying glass� of domestic democratic shortcomings becomes less relevant.
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