Bienes humanos y normatividad moral: La crítica de G.E.M Anscombe al concepto de "moral ought"

• Autores: José María Torralba López
• Localización: Acta Philosophica: rivista internazionale di filosofia, ISSN 1121-2179, Vol. 19, Nº. 2, 2010, págs. 349-362
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Elizabeth Anscombe’s critique on consequentialism in her “Modern Moral Philosophy” marked a milestone in the development of Anglo-American moral philosophy and virtue ethics. First of all, I briefly indicate the historical context of her criticism, as well as the proper meaning of rejection of “moral ought”. Second, I will consider the relation between obligation and virtues, through the notion of moral modalities and human needs. Last, I will formulate some suggestions on the relation between moral normativity and human goods.