Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon's Second Government

• Autores: Osnat Akirav, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 16, Nº. 2, 2010, págs. 251-267
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • How do multi-party coalition governments share agenda power? In principle, coalitions might allocate agenda power among their members by distributing special proposal rights, distributing special blocking rights, or both. The literature has prominent models embodying each polar possibility, with Laver and Shepsle's model envisaging that each party in a coalition has the ability to propose any bill(s) it wishes within the jurisdiction of a ministry it controls; and Cox and McCubbins' cartel theory envisaging that each party has the ability to block bills, thus necessitating collective bargaining over the overall agenda. This paper shows that agenda-setting in Israel is not consistent with the 'ministerial dictatorship' version of the Laver-Shepsle model but is consistent with the Cox-McCubbins model.