Committee Property Rights, Executive Dominance, and Political Parties in Latin American Legislatures

• Autores: Charles J. Finocchiaro, Gregg B. Johnson
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 16, Nº. 2, 2010, págs. 151-175
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Motivated by theories of congressional committees in the US context, and building on the growing body of work focusing on the institutional features of legislatures in Latin American presidential systems, this paper explores two previously overlooked aspects of committee politics. Using comparative data from three Latin American countries, it examines the strategic and jurisdictional dynamics in which chamber leaders assign bills to committees and then investigate the factors affecting presidential and partisan success within committees. In general, the authors find that committees have strong property rights and that characteristics of both bills and bill initiators strongly influence the survival of legislation in committee. The results shed light on the effects of institutional design on the policy process in presidential systems.