En este artículo se considera someramente la controversia entre Husserl y Natorp relativa al sentido de la reflexión psicológica y, con ello, de la actividad fenomenológica. Trataré de presentar la legitimidad de las críticas que Husserl y Natorp se hacen respectivamente. Eso llevará a indicar una tarea que sigue imponiéndosenos todavía: la dilucidación del concreto sentido del quehacer fenomenológico.
In this paper I will bring into consideration the controversy between Husserl and Natorp dealing with the accurate meaning of the psychological reflection and, altogether with that issue, how the phenomenological activity should be assumed. I will try to present the legitimacy of some of the critics which Natorp and Husserl make to each other. This will lead us to a point where we will be confronted with a major problem which is posed on us: the elucidation of the concrete sense of the phenomenological activity.
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