Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules

• Autores: José M. Jiménez Gómez
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 15, 2010
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint. In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems. Specifially, by using, on the one hand, the Unanimous Concessions mechanism we justify Piniles' and the Constrained Egalitarian rules, and, on the other hand, with the Diminishing Claims procedure we retrieve the Dual of Pinile's and the Dual of Constrained Egalitarian rules.