Bargaining with Commitment under an Uncertain Deadline

• Autores: Vicente Calabuig, Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren, Antoni Cunyat
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 111
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The horizon of a bargaining game is an important factor in determining the outcome of a negotiation process. There exist situations in which a last period is not perceived, i.e, infinite horizon games. On the contrary, there are negotiations in which the final period determines, from the beginning of the game, the strategic behavior of the players. However, in some situations both types of horizon may emerge. For example, many negotiations on environmental issues or labor conditions are conducted under the pressure of a possible intervention of the government by imposing a deadline if the parties do not reach an agreement.

    Therefore, when players engage in such negotiations, even though they may perceive that there is room for a counterproposal, they can also perceive that at any time the government can impose a deadline after which there will not be scope for an agreement.