Pareto Optimality in Multicriteria Bargaining

• Autores: Amparo M. Mármol Conde, Luisa Monroy Berjillos, Victoriana Rubiales Caballero
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 87
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A multicriteria bargaining problem is a generalization of the classical bargaining problem where each player has a set of criteria to value any decision.

    To analyze these situations we have to jointly consider two decision problems:

    one related to the preferences of the players with respect to their own criteria, and the other problem of selecting a solution that could be accepted by all the rational players.

    In the paper we assume that the utility function of each of the players is not known explicitly. As a first step to find a solution, we have to establish the minimal requirements for the outcomes that the rational players will be willing to accept. In other words, we have to extend the Pareto-optimality or nondominance condition inherent in the axiomatic bargaining solutions, to the case of multicriteria bargaining. Depending on the concept of dominance considered in both, the set of players and the sets of criteria of each player, we present a range of possibilities for the generalized Pareto-optimality axiom and explore the relationship among them.

    In this sense, we provide a general framework where we locate the existing solution concepts for multicriteria bargaining problems and that permits us to define other concepts based on different dominance structures.