On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations

• Autores: Flip Klijn, Herbert Hamers, Bas van Velzen
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 83
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Sequencing situations are characterized by a finite number of jobs lined up in front of one (or more) machine(s) that have to be processed on the machine(s).

    Because every time unit a job is in the system will incur costs, a single decision maker wants to determine a processing order of the jobs that minimizes total costs (or maximizes cost savings). This single decision maker problem can be transformed into a multiple decision makers problem by taking agents into account that own (at least) one job. In such a model a group of agents (coalition) can save costs by cooperation. For the determination of the maximal cost savings of a coalition one can use techniques from linear and combinatorial optimization theory.