The Value of Public Information in a Cournot Duopoly

• Autores: Diego Moreno, Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 48
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In a Cournot duopoly where there is uncertainty about the market demand and/or the cost function, the value of public information is determined by the curvature of an associated real-valued function: if this function is convex (concave) then the value of public information is positive (negative). These results allow us to identify interesting subclasses of industries where the value of public information is positive (negative), and are useful in specific applications.