On the number of swings in the Nice voting game

• Autores: J.R. Fernández, Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, J.J. López
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 11
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present a new method to compute the number of swings in weighted voting games as well as weighted double and triple majority games. We calculate the swings in an exact way by generating functions, with a significant decrease in the computational complexity. Moreover, these swings are calculated for the decision rules approved in the Nice summit meeting, which will be used in the European Union enlarged to 27 countries. We show that the triple majority rule adopted is quasi equivalent to a weighted voting game. Therefore, the required population quota to approve a decision does not change the voting power of the European countries.