Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of Electoral Democracies, 1990-2008

• Autores: Robert Elgie
• Localización: Government and opposition: An international journal of comparative politics, ISSN 0017-257X, Nº. 1, 2010, págs. 29-49
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Semi-presidentialism is the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to the legislature. A common argument against the adoption of a semi-presidential constitution by a new democracy is the problem of cohabitation - where a president from one party holds power at the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party and where the president's party is not represented in the cabinet. The concern is that cohabitation creates competing power centres within the executive that are dangerous for young democracies. This article shows that cohabitation has been directly associated with the collapse of a young democracy in only one case. Moreover, by specifying the conditions under which cohabitation can occur, we also show that the threat of cohabitation has been associated with collapse in only one further case. We suggest that this is so because cohabitation refers to a very specific situation that can only occur under a certain combination of circumstances that can often be avoided. Overall, we show that there is little evidence to support one of the most well-known and long-standing arguments against semi-presidentialism. Thus, while semi-presidentialism may indeed be perilous for new democracies, we conclude that it is perilous for reasons other than the problem of cohabitation.