Algunas presuposiciones metafísicas de la acción humana
- Autores: John Haldane
- Localización: Anuario filosófico, ISSN 0066-5215, Vol. 27, Nº 3, 1994, págs. 923-938
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
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Resumen
In opposition to compatibilism, it is argued that the thesis of universal causal determinism is at odds with the idea of free action. Free agency involves liberty of indifference -that is to say the non-determination of action by antecedent events-. Action issues from habitual behavioural tendencies; but this relation is neither deterministic nor random: it is one of propensity, in this case conditioned by practical rationality. In general, specifying reasons for action is not identifying antecedent causes but describing the intentional content of action -saying what kind of behaviour it is-. Practical reasons directs the agent's behaviour towards ends conceived of as good; it is further question whether, as Plato suggest, the end of action, standardly, is a, or the, good.
