Citizens' freedom to choose representatives: Ballot structure, proportionality and "fragmented" parliaments

• Autores: Paulo Trigo Pereira, Joao Andrade e Silva
• Localización: Electoral Studies: An international Journal, ISSN 0261-3794, Vol. 28, Nº. 1, 2009, págs. 101-110
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens' freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens' freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral formulas. Using data from 26 countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters' freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.