A fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy account of the Liar paradox

• Autores: Nikolay Nikolov
• Localización: Mathware & soft computing: The Magazine of the European Society for Fuzzy Logic and Technology, ISSN-e 1134-5632, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, 2002, págs. 25-32
• Idioma: inglés
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Estudio de la paradoja del mentiroso desde las lógicas difusa y difusa intuicionista
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• Resumen

  • The Liar paradox, or the sentence What I am now saying is false and its various guises have been attracting the attention of logicians and linguists since ancient times. A commonly accepted treatment of the Liar paradox [7,8] is by means of Situation semantics, a powerful approach to natural language analysis. It is based on the machinery of non-well-founded sets developed in [1]. In this paper we show how to generalize these results including elements of fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [3,4]. Basing on the results, a way is proposed towards solving the problem of modelling the two levels of Situation theory -infons and propositions- with a single one retaining the specific features of the two-levels logics.