A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags

• Autores: Aitor Ciarreta Antuñano, Carlos Gutiérrez Hita
• Localización: DFAE-II WP Series, ISSN-e 1988-088X, Nº. 8, 2008
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic .rms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of .rms.