Modal inference and the free-will problem

• Autores: Peter Van Inwagen
• Localización: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN-e 1989-4651, ISSN 1130-0507, Nº 3, 1991 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Teoria de la acción / Action Theory), págs. 57-63
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • It has long been held that arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism depend upon a modal fallacy. This charge was revived by Michael Slote in his important 1982 article, "Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem". In that article, Slote criticized my own work and the work of several other philosophers who had argued for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. In the present article, I defend my arguments against Slote's charge that they involve invalid modal reasoning.