On meaning as use and the inscrutability of reference

• Autores: David Checkland
• Localización: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN-e 1989-4651, ISSN 1130-0507, Nº 2, 1990 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Aspectos de la Filosofía de L. Wittgenstein), págs. 71-85
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper I argue that there are two strands at work in Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea of the "Logically proper name" and its associated doctrine, ostensive definition. The first strand is a certain holism presupposed by both intentions to mean (Meinen) and meaning (Bedeutung). The second strand is the idea that the way a word or sentence is used- its point or role in the lives of its users- is internal to meaning, and not some additional or optional feature. These strands are parallelled in Davidson's doctrine of the inscrutability of reference by the idea that reference is a theoretical posit needed to apply a holistic theory of meaning, and that assignments of reference are also determined holistically, as is the role of casuality.