Tip policy, visibility and quality of service in cafés

• Ido Erev ^[2] ; Rachel Barkan ^[1] ; Einat Zinger ^[2] ; Mayan Tzach ^[2]
  1. [1] Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

     Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

     Israel

     
  2. [2] Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

     Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

     Israel

     
• Localización: Tourism economics: the business and finance of tourism and recreation, ISSN 1354-8166, Vol. 10, Nº 4, 2004, págs. 449-462
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • This research studied the effect of tip policy and visibility on service quality in cafés. Applying social dilemma research to cafés suggests that service quality may be deteriorated by two types of free-riding behaviour. These free-riding behaviours include reduced-effort activities and the overuse of limited common resources. The theoretical framework implies that it is difficult to solve both problems simultaneously. For example, an individual tip policy can solve the problem of reduced effort as it motivates each server to work for his or her own tip. However, this policy intensifies the competition between the servers over limited common resources.

    Shared tip policy operates in the opposite way, solving the latter problem yet intensifying the former. Similarly, visibility conditions (moderating monitoring and social comparison) affect the two freeriding behaviours in opposite ways. Two field studies indicated that tip policy and visibility were interacting and that quality service could be attained with two combinations. Individual tip policy leads to quality service when combined with low visibility. Shared tip policy leads to quality service when combined with high visibility.

    The findings demonstrate the difficulty, but also the potential of generalizing social dilemma research to natural settings.