Resumen de An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games
Francisco Javier Arin Aguirre, Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen
This paper follows an axiomatic approach to the problem of combining stability and egalitarianism in the context of transferable utility games. We consider two notions of egalitarianism, a weak and a strong one. One of the results of the paper is that every value on the class of balanced games that satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Symmetry, and Continuity selects a weakly egalitarian point in the core. By adding a fourth axiom we obtain a full characterization of one of these values: the point in the core that minimizes the Euclidean distance to the origin. We also provide axiomatizations of egalitarian values on two subclasses of balanced games: the class of convex games, and the class of games with a large core.
