Foundations for Contest Success Functions

• Autores: Luis C. Corchón Díaz, Matthias Dahm
• Localización: Documentos de trabajo. Economic series ( Universidad Carlos III. Departamento de Economía ), Nº. 4, 2007
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • We examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants¿ incomplete information concerning the `type¿ of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones.