La ontología de la proposición en el Russell de "The Principles of Mathematics" y los artículos de Meinong

• Autores: Francisco Manuel Saurí Mercader
• Localización: Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència, ISSN-e 0213-5965, Nº. 35, 2005, págs. 45-64
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Bertrand Russell, in The Principles of Mathematics and ¿Meinong¿s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions¿, maintains a unitary conception of the ontology of propositions. He makes a difference between judgment and proposition. Propositions are independent entities and they have different presentations.

    False propositions subsist; this is related to the relation in the proposition called ¿affirmation¿ and the double condition of predicates (meaning and term). But that conception has bad consequences for the unity and identity of proposition.