Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

• Autores: Santiago Rubio, Begoña Casino Martínez
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 7, Nº 2, 2005, págs. 89-110
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.