Moral judgment in States of deliberative equilibrium

• Autores: Ricardo Parellada
• Localización: Revista de filosofía, ISSN-e 1988-284X, ISSN 0034-8244, Nº 31, 1, 2006, págs. 167-180
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Ethical theory examines human action in general terms, whereas moral judgment takes place in particular situations. These situations often cannot be subsumed easily under general norms and call for a delicate balance of norms and circumstances. I describe situations where opposing courses of action seem morally reasonable and I call them states of deliberative equilibrium. I review Aristotle¿s and Kant¿s conceptions of moral judgment and I offer a rule for stepping from deliberation to judgment in many situations of equilibrium.