Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Financial Intermediaries
- Autores: Vicente Salas Fumás, Rafael Crespí Cladera, Miguel Ángel García Cestona
- Localización: Documents de Treball ( Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa ), ISSN-e 1988-7736, Nº. 9, 2002
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.
