Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting

• Autores: Pirmin Stekeler Weithofer
• Localización: Pragmatics and cognition, ISSN 0929-0907, Vol. 13, Nº 1, 2005 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The Pragmatics of Making it Explicit On Robert B. Brandom), págs. 7-38
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Wittgenstein's original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom's normative pragmatics.