Multibidding Game under Uncertainty

• Autores: Róbert F. Veszteg
• Localización: Working Papers ( Universidad de Navarra. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales ), Nº. 14, 2004, 36 págs.
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding mechanism according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information. It can be applied in a wide range of situations, and its symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria deliver ex post efficient outcomes if the number of players is two - for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty - or very large.