Bargaining in committees of representatives: the optimal voting rule

• Autores: Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano Llovera
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 24, 2005
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement.