Bidding strategies of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed by Experienced Bidders

• Autores: Tibor Neugebauer
• Localización: Cuadernos de economía: Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, ISSN 0210-0266, ISSN-e 2340-6704, Vol. 27, Nº. 75, 2004, págs. 153-184
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model serves as a benchmark. The equilibrium strategy does not describe any of the heterogeneous automata programs submitted by subjects and does not always perform better than average in the tournament.