Legislator turnover and lobbyist exits

• Autores: James M. Strickland
• Localización: Legislative studies quarterly, ISSN 0362-9805, Vol. 50, N. 3, 2025
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Turnover among legislators encourages lobbyists to exit their profession since turnover is associated with decreased wages and increased workplace stress for lobbyists. I examine the exits of 5566 lobbyists who registered in eighteen states in 1973. Turnover among legislators is associated with increased rates of exit among lobbyists. I also test for whether various individual traits determine exit. Contrary to expectations, former legislators who lobby are not more likely to exit in response to turnover among incumbents than other lobbyists, including turnover in the chambers in which they served. These findings suggest that legislator turnover ends relationships with lawmakers or reduces skills among lobbyists, but that non-revolver lobbyists are more affected by such turnover than others. These findings matter for institutional reforms that affect legislative turnover, and the representation of organized interests