Accountability, analysis and avoidance: how PMO data impacts on Westminster

• Worthy, Ben ^[1] ; Langehennig, Stefani ^[2]
  1. [1] University of London

     University of London

     Reino Unido

     
  2. [2] University of Denver

     University of Denver

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 31, Nº. 1, 2025, págs. 1-19
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Parliamentary Monitoring Organisations [PMOs] seek to make legislators more accountable and reduce the potential moral hazards of delegation. This study of the UK finds that PMOs do reduce such hazards and make for greater ‘informatory’ accountability from MPs and Peers. The primary effect is on the House of Commons, and on individual MPs, where information seeking is most frequently local. The exact impact is variable, and depends on whether a Member is in government or opposition, how long they have served and, more subtly, whether they are male or female. The impact of PMOs is uneven, and can provoke resistance and gaming or fuel political conflict.