Philosophical Issues

• 

  Año 2013, Vol. 23, Número 1

  • Pyrrhonian skepticism and human agency

    Ernest Sosa

    págs. 1-17

    

  • Skeptical challenges and knowing actions

    Stephen Hetherington

    págs. 18-39

    

  • fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency

    Baron Reed

    págs. 40-69

    

  • Rational 'ought' implies 'can'

    Ralph Wedgwood

    págs. 70-92

    

  • Obsessive thoughts and inner voices

    Lucy O'Brien

    págs. 93-108

    

  • The possibility of epistemic responsibility

    págs. 109-131

    

  • Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency

    Conor McHugh

    págs. 132-157

    

  • Is epistemic agency possible?

    Pascal Engel

    • Resumen

    págs. 158-178

    

  • Epistemic agency: some doubts

    Kieran Setiya

    págs. 179-198

    

  • Can virtue epistemology capitalize on jtb's appeal?

    E.J. Coffman

    págs. 199-222

    

  • In defense of reflection

    Valerie Tiberius

    págs. 223-243

    

  • Intellectual autonomy

    Linda Zagzebski

    págs. 244-261

    

  • A neo-stoic approach to epistemic agency

    Sarah Wright

    • Resumen

    págs. 262-275

    

  • Why we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement

    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij

    • Resumen

    págs. 276-296

    

  • Scope for rational autonomy

    Mark Schroeder

    págs. 297-310

    

  • why we reason the way we do

    Nishi Shah

    págs. 311-325

    

  • Cognitive diversity and epistemic norms

    Jessica Brown

    págs. 326-342

    

  • Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons

    Michael P. Lynch

    págs. 343-362

    

  • The rejection of epistemic consequentialism

    Selim Berker

    págs. 363-387

    

  • What is an inference?

    Ram Neta

    págs. 388-407

    

  • Errata for philosophical issues, volume 23

    págs. 408-409

    

  • Contributors

    págs. 410-411