Review of economic studies

• 

  Año 2001, Vol. 68, Número 1

  • Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.

    Shingo Ishiguro, Hideshi Itoh

    pág. 1

    

  • Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability.

    David E.M. Sappington, Tracy R. Lewis

    pág. 21

    

  • Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle.

    James M. Malcomson, James A. Fairburn

    pág. 45

    

  • Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy.

    Stephen Coate, Timothy Besley

    pág. 67

    

  • The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions.

    Alessandra Casella

    pág. 83

    

  • A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty.

    Roger Lagunoff

    pág. 109

    

  • Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.

    Carlo Perroni

    pág. 133

    

  • Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders.

    Jean-pierre Benoit, Vijay Krishna

    pág. 155

    

  • Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing.

    Christian Gollier

    pág. 181

    

  • Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates.

    Emmanuel Saez

    pág. 205