Economic Theory: Official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

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  Año 2005, Vol. 26, Número 2

  • Foreword to `Rationality and Equilibrium¿ - A Symposium in honor of Marcel K. Richter

    Nicholas C. Yannelis, Daniel McFadden, Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rosa L. Matzkin, James C. Moore

    págs. 243-244

    

  • Revealed stochastic preference: a synthesis

    Daniel L. McFadden

    págs. 245-264

    

  • Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes¿ and `coverups¿

    Roger Lagunoff, Luca Anderlini

    págs. 265-299

    

  • The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games

    Lin Zhou

    págs. 301-308

    

  • Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences

    Sophie Bade

    págs. 309-332

    

  • Remarks concerning concave utility functions on finite sets

    Yakar Kannai

    págs. 333-344

    

  • Walrasian versus quasi-competitive equilibrium and the core of a production economy

    James C. Moore

    págs. 345-359

    

  • Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

    Emma Moreno García, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Carlos Hervés Beloso

    págs. 361-381

    

  • Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations

    Alexander Kovalenkov, Myrna Wooders

    págs. 383-396

    

  • Existence of equilibria for economies with externalities and a measure space of consumers

    Mihaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet

    págs. 397-421

    

  • Identification of consumers¿ preferences when their choices are unobservable

    Rosa L. Matzkin

    págs. 423-443

    

  • Log-concave probability and its applications

    Ted Bergstrom, Mark Bagnoli

    págs. 445-469