Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ω-Inconsistency
- Autores: Bruno Da Ré
- Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 22, Nº. 1, 2018, págs. 171-188
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ω-consistent, all conceptual concerns don’t apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I’ll explore if it’s possible to have an inconsistent, butω-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.
