Resumen de Kant’s Emotional Normativity and the Embodiment of Reason: Interests, Reflection and Feelings
This contribution aims to provide an overview of the image of human epistemic and practical agency drawn by reason, aesthetic reflection, and moral feeling, especially within the context of the “emotional turn” that research on Kant’s philosophy has undergone in recent decades. This chapter will first point out that reason does not lead the subject to adopt feelings that foster their own happiness, but rather, motivates the individual to seek a theoretical grounding in epistemology. Second, I shall highlight that the reflexion on judgment acquaints the subject with an emotional state that allows her to disregard her own egoistic inclinations and attune her views and judgments with those of others. Finally, I will analyze the fact that, in Kant’s view, certain feelings should be cultivated as a way of attaining moral strength and thus becoming better able to both control temporary mental disorders while also progressively overcoming human frailty of will.
