Resumen de Multi-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Accounts Receivable Financing under the Application of Central Bank Digital Currency

Qinglei Zhang, Dihong Yang, Jiyun Qin

• Accounts receivable financing is one of the most prominent financing approaches in supply chain finance; nevertheless, in the actual financing process, financial institutions and SMEs have credit risk and information asymmetry risk, which leads to frequent nonpayment and collaboration fraudulent loans. This paper introduces central bank digital currency into traditional accounts receivable financing and solves the credit risk and information asymmetry risk using two technologies of central bank digital currency: digital technology and blockchain technology; digital technology enables the supervision of capital flow, and blockchain technology enables for access to logistics and information flow. In the context of using central bank digital currency technology, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of whether financial institutions use central bank digital currency and whether SMEs repay the loan, compares the evolutionary stabilization strategies of financial institutions and SMEs, calculates and analyzes the model’s impact, investigates changes in the decision-making and evolutionary paths of both parties, and then conducts numerical simulation analysis using Matlab and Python to verify the model’s reliability further. According to the results, adding central bank digital currency to the traditional accounts receivable financing model can reduce the loan risk of financial institutions, increase the credibility of accounts receivable financing, expedite the implementation of accounts receivable financing, and alleviate the financing concerns of SMEs