Resumen de Presentism, Truthmaking, and Laws of Nature
This talk addresses the so called “truthmaker objection” to presentism, and a reply to this objection that I call “the laws-of-nature-proposal” (LOP). This proposal has been recently defended by Ned Markosian, who is one of the major present advocates of presentism. I will argue that, although initially appealing, LOP fails to meet a constraint that is generally taken as part of the challenge behind the truthmaker objection: namely, that the entities invoked to do truthmaker work be categoric entities, in a sense to be specified. Thus, I conclude LOP is unsatisfactory as a solution to the truthmaker problem so conceived. However, I will conclude by discussing to which extent the violated constraint is a sensible one and therefore to which extent the truthmaker objection so conceived is really a damaging problem for presentism.
