The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements with Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design

• Alan O. Sykes ^[1]
  1. [1] Stanford Law School
• Localización: American Journal of International Law, ISSN 0002-9300, Vol. 113, Nº 3, 2019, págs. 482-534
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This Article argues that international investment agreements (IIAs) serve a dual economic function—to discipline host country policies that impose international externalities on foreign investors, and to curtail inefficient risks associated with agency costs, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and time inconsistency problems that uneconomically increase the cost of imported capital in host countries. It draws on the economic analysis to explain central features of IIAs and their evolution over time, and to address various controversial issues in international investment litigation.