Common-sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science

• Monton, Bradley ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Colorado at Boulder
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 11, Nº. 2, 2007, págs. 117-126
• Idioma: portugués
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science. 1. The Potential TensionBas van Fraassen is a common-sense realist: Constructive empiricism